01-01-2011, 11:14 AM
After putting in my two cents on this TSA thread recently, and at the risk of injecting gray shades and complexity into an already complicated thread, here's a followup. After posting my comments I received an email from a Punawebber who wrote:
Hello *,
Turns out he was interested in the incident and here's his response, which he said was OK to pass on, plus I've added some additional points from my later conversation with him.
The first was that, in his estimate (he is an experienced ALPA negotiator on contract issues), it was a TSA staffing shortage that lead to the decision to not physically screen the ground personnel. Wow, we need more TSA! Didn't anticipate that one.[*note below] Apparently they can handle a few pilots, but not physically screening hundreds of "rampers" and others coming on to shifts at major airports every day. (Politically, how would the news of a "big increase" in TSA personnel be greeted?) Second, for the ground people it's ATM level security with an individual passcode as well as the card and the card can be deactivated instantly.[**note] Third, at most airports the employee entrances actually are observed by TSA, particularly for the hold-the-door-open behavior that any employee (like me at high tech companies) knows they are not supposed to do. Obviously not perfect, but not to the level of the pilot egregiously breaking his FFDO agreement (also, if he was unaware of his violations and surprised by the government's response, he's not a shining example of someone who thinks ahead and has some idea of effective action; not what I would want in a pilot.)
Finally, there's another financial point. He believes that access security protocols should be equal across all people who work in the secure areas, with biometrics, probably fingerprint scans, becoming part of the screening. Biometrics are part of the CrewPASS proposal. Unfortunately no one, neither the airlines or TSA, wants to pay for the hardware and software (hundreds of airports in the US), though TSA is willing to set it up and administer it. So the quicker, more reliable and nonintrusive methods are apparently off the table for lack of funds. And a further point. If we had the funds and if we tried to extend the quicker, more reliable and nonintrusive biometrics to the general public, we would get extreme levels of screaming about national databases, and even far worse paranoia. And, of course, identity is not the only issue.
So I don't know if any of this reassures you, but his reflections on the problems of security screening mirror the real, complicated world out there. And clearly at least the pilots are thinking about the situation and trying to do something about it. I do hope TSA moves quickly beyond the intrusive screening and implements far better and more reliable methods. Not sure how that's going to happen though.
[*note] In a later conversation, he said that personnel increases were not the only option to cover a broader airport security scope and cited, without specificity, that "resource allocation" was an issue. Possibly he is implying that efficient use of TSA personnel by management might be an issue. No great surprise there.
[**note] These swipe doors can be very complexly programmed, including timers for hold-the-door behavior, sensors for number of people by the door after one swipe, traps, etc. Mostly depends on management security policy and physical layout.
quote:Our son is an experienced airline pilot, as I noted in the thread. The linked story is about recent news that a 50 year old pilot took cell phone videos of airport employees apparently entering and leaving secured areas with a simple card swipe. He had his status as a Federal Flight Deck Officer revoked by the TSA and his gun confiscated. He was "surprised" by the federal response. Comments on the article were largely cheering on a whistle blower. Here's my email response to the Punawebber which, after talking with my son, I thought might be useful to further share:
Your son may be interested in this story, being a pilot:
http://www.news10.net/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=113529&catid=2
Best wishes for an excellent new year ahead in 2011.
Hello *,
Turns out he was interested in the incident and here's his response, which he said was OK to pass on, plus I've added some additional points from my later conversation with him.
quote:Talking with him later, I asked about the evident point that the pilot was complaining about the ground personnels' seeming ease of access rather than treatment of the pilots. He reiterated that, whatever, the guy was wrong to go about his issue the way he did. He hurt other people, particularly pilots and maybe more. He feels that pilots bear a particular responsibility for security and this pilot went low. He went on to describe several points.
This pilot definitely went about voicing the issues with TSA security and inspections of pilots the wrong way. He did release Sensitive Security Information (SSI) which does have fines and penalties associated with it. It’s like an ATF agent going on YouTube and saying this is the best way to produce, ship, and sell moonshine. When you sign up for airline pilot service, especially FFDO service, security information is made available to you and you are compelled to not make it public. Now, the stuff he points out is quite obvious to most airline pilots as they work through the airport system in this country. Though his points may be accurate, his methods are not worthy of praise.
Also, ALPA is working on a system (CrewPASS) for current and active airline pilots to use their airline credentials to gain access to the secure areas of airports. A lot of that process is based upon airline pilots taking security seriously and not thumbing their nose at TSA in the process. Plus, these kinds of “stunts” never change policy. Policy is changed at the bureaucratic level; unfortunately after laborious discussion, law suits, and arbitrations. We’ve elected a bureaucracy to administer our society. We must work within that system to affect change. If he wanted to change the system, he could have testified in front of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. He could have made presentations to the House Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities or the Senate Subcommitee on Emerging Threats and Capabilites.
This guy just made CrewPASS much more difficult to achieve. In fact just today, air crew access to airports just got a little more restrictive, but I can’t say more than that.
The first was that, in his estimate (he is an experienced ALPA negotiator on contract issues), it was a TSA staffing shortage that lead to the decision to not physically screen the ground personnel. Wow, we need more TSA! Didn't anticipate that one.[*note below] Apparently they can handle a few pilots, but not physically screening hundreds of "rampers" and others coming on to shifts at major airports every day. (Politically, how would the news of a "big increase" in TSA personnel be greeted?) Second, for the ground people it's ATM level security with an individual passcode as well as the card and the card can be deactivated instantly.[**note] Third, at most airports the employee entrances actually are observed by TSA, particularly for the hold-the-door-open behavior that any employee (like me at high tech companies) knows they are not supposed to do. Obviously not perfect, but not to the level of the pilot egregiously breaking his FFDO agreement (also, if he was unaware of his violations and surprised by the government's response, he's not a shining example of someone who thinks ahead and has some idea of effective action; not what I would want in a pilot.)
Finally, there's another financial point. He believes that access security protocols should be equal across all people who work in the secure areas, with biometrics, probably fingerprint scans, becoming part of the screening. Biometrics are part of the CrewPASS proposal. Unfortunately no one, neither the airlines or TSA, wants to pay for the hardware and software (hundreds of airports in the US), though TSA is willing to set it up and administer it. So the quicker, more reliable and nonintrusive methods are apparently off the table for lack of funds. And a further point. If we had the funds and if we tried to extend the quicker, more reliable and nonintrusive biometrics to the general public, we would get extreme levels of screaming about national databases, and even far worse paranoia. And, of course, identity is not the only issue.
So I don't know if any of this reassures you, but his reflections on the problems of security screening mirror the real, complicated world out there. And clearly at least the pilots are thinking about the situation and trying to do something about it. I do hope TSA moves quickly beyond the intrusive screening and implements far better and more reliable methods. Not sure how that's going to happen though.
[*note] In a later conversation, he said that personnel increases were not the only option to cover a broader airport security scope and cited, without specificity, that "resource allocation" was an issue. Possibly he is implying that efficient use of TSA personnel by management might be an issue. No great surprise there.
[**note] These swipe doors can be very complexly programmed, including timers for hold-the-door behavior, sensors for number of people by the door after one swipe, traps, etc. Mostly depends on management security policy and physical layout.
]