Mr. Dolan, even self laudatory statements, if untrue and knowingly made can subject an attorney to discipline. Lawyers know that any licensed attorney with 3 years good standing service, 2 sponsors, and $200 will be admitted to the United States Supreme Court. No test required. And it is certainly not an endorsement of legal skill. More that 30 years ago, My evidence professor, the late Kenneth B. Hughes told his class: “Evidence is not a required class at this school but appellate advocacy is. Now appellate advocacy will teach you how to argue a case before the United States Supreme Court.Of course you will practice for 40 years without even getting close to the Supreme Court but what the hell when you do, you will be ready.” The Office of the Prosecuting Attorney could, if it chose to do so, do a mass application for all attorneys in the office with more than 3 years experience and pay the $200 per head fee, and all of us would magically have certificates of admission the the Supreme Court. Would that suddenly make us better lawyers? Don’t believe me check the website:
http://www.supremecourt.gov/bar/baradmissions.aspx
Thus any time a lawyer points to a certificate from the U.S. Supreme Court as proof of his skill, grab your wallet and head for the exit.
When Mr. Dolan says that he is a foremost expert on the defense of dwi cases, having handled 10,000 or more cases, in 4.5 years as a public defender, he is asking to be disciplined. Sorry, the numbers do not work. When he says that he has had more than 1,000 jury trials. Do not believe him, the numbers do not work. If he had those kinds of jury trial numbers he would be alongside Sir Lionel Luckhoo in Guinness. He is not. If he had those kinds of numbers, he would have put them in his applications for admission to the Minnesota Bar. He did not:
Dolan’s situation is more difficult to assess, as the original denial was based on the accreditation requirement, followed by an appeal to the supreme court, without a request for a waiver or an evidentiary hearing. Dolan was admitted to the bar in two other jurisdictions after successfully completing their bar examinations, was editor in chief of his school’s law review, and has practiced for twelve years. Dolan’s factual record, however, is less clear cut than the record presented by Schober. Dolan offers no explanation for his law school’s lack of ABA-accreditation, but asserts that UWLA Law School “Just cannot afford to be accedited by the ABA” Dolan has not presented any ABA review of UWLA stating the basis for non-accreditation or indicating the academic quality of the school. The Board also points out that there are several facts revealed in Dolan’s application that warranty further scrutiny, including his voluntary filing of bankruptcy in 1980, his post traumatic stress syndrome following an auto accident, as well as his claim for workers’ compensation based on job stress as deputy public defender. The Board has had no opportunity to investigate these issues because Dolan did not request a hearing. We decline to serve as finders of fact and evaluate this application on the limited facts before us. Instead, we remand the application of Petitioner Dolan to the Board of Law Examiners for a hearing and development of a complete factual record if he wishes to pursue the matter further. We retain jurisdiction to review the Board’s recommendation in this case.
While this decision disposes of the case before us, we address briefly petitioner Dolan’s arguments that equity and constitutional protections require he be admitted now to this state’s bar.
Dolan argues that he was actually surprised by the accreditation requirement and that equity requires this court to waive the rule in his case. In Hansen, this court stated “ere petitioner able to demonstrate that Minnesota’s rules regarding graduation from an ABA-accredited law school come as a complete surprise to him, there might be some support for the argument that principles of fairness require us seriously to consider waiving [the rule].” Hansen,275 N.W.2d at 798. In Hansen, the petitioner had been advised specifically of his law school’s lack of ABA-accreditation as well as the possible effects of any attempt to practice in Minnesota, before he entered the non-accredited law school. There is no such evidence here. Dolan asserts that at the time he went to law school he did not know or consider Minnesota’s bar admission requirements, nor was he aware of the accreditation status of his school. He also claims he was unaware of the accreditation requirement at the time he applied for admission to this state’s bar.
If surprise were to constitute an equitable basis for waiver of Rule II, then the relevant period to test whether the petitioner understood the accreditation requirements was during law school. Dolan’s claims that he was unaware of the accreditation status of his law school at the time are unsupported by evidence that the school obscured or withheld such information. Dolan’s claim that he was surprised by Minnesota’s admission standards at the time of his application is at best irrelevant. There is no equitable reason to waive application of Rule II(A)(3) for an attorney with 12 years of experience simply because he failed to read it. Constructive notice at the time of application is not unfair; under Hansen, actual notice at the time of attending law school may be required. We defer ruling on this issue until we receive the recommendation and full factual record of the Board.
Finally, Dolan contends constitutional analysis of the accreditation requirement under the privileges and immunities clause of the U. S. Constitution is required. Dolan frames the issue as “whether Minnesota’s rule * * * meets a constitution test that their is a ‘substantial reason’ for discrimination between practicing lawyers who have not graduated from an ABA-approved law school and those that have.” Requiring strict adherence to Rule II(A)(3) in a Rule IV application for admission, he argues, impairs an attorney’s right to earn a living in this state, infringing a constitutional right under the privileges and immunities clause as enumerated in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
The privileges and immunities clause requires that a state accord residents and non-residents equal treatment in activities bearing on the operation of the nation as a single entity. Piper, 470 U.S. at 279, (citing Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978)). While Piper concluded the practice of law falls within the ambit of this clause, Piper has no further applicability to this case. Minnesota’s requirement that applicants for admission to the bar graduate from an ABA-accredited law school, does not discriminate between residents and non-residents. Piper explicitly recognizes that states may continue to regulate their bars, so long as residents and non-residents are subject to the same professional and personal qualification requirements. Piper, 470 U.S. at 284, n. 16. What Dolan is actually raising is an equal protection claim, disputing the disparate treatment given to the class of practicing attorneys who did not graduate from ABA-approved law schools. Both equal protection and due process claims were fully considered by this court in In re Hansen, and need not be redecided differently here.
We therefore order that the petition of Milton Schober is granted, and that he be admitted to the Bar of Minnesota. We order that the application of Paul Dolan be remanded to the Board of Law Examiners for development of a complete factual record if he wishes to pursue the matter further.
It is so ordered.
or at least in his second application:
April 17, 1992
PAUL R. DOLAN, PETITIONER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS, RESPONDENT.
En Banc. Keith
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Keith
Petitioner failed to show either hardship or other compelling reasons on which to base a waiver of Rule II A(3), Rules of the Supreme Court and of the State Board of Law Examiners for Admission to the Bar, requiring graduation from a law school accredited by the American Bar Association.
Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.
KEITH, Chief Justice.
Paul Dolan requests, for the second time, that this court reverse the Minnesota Board of Law Examiner’s denial of his admission to practice law in Minnesota. The factual background of his case is set forth in our opinion issued subsequent to Dolan’s first appeal to the court. In re Dolan, 445 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1989).
Dolan’s application for admission to practice law in Minnesota was denied by the Board of Law Examiners (Board) on the basis that he did not receive his law degree from an American Bar Association (ABA) accredited law school. Graduation from an ABA approved law school and passage of a written bar examination remains the two-pronged standard by which we judge the competence of applicants for admission to the Minnesota bar. In re Dolan, 445 N.W.2d at 556; Rule II A(3) and Rule II A(4). *fn1 Rule IV allows admission without examination based upon years of practice in another state. The Board of Law Examiners is also authorized, under Rule I B(6), to grant waivers of strict compliance with these Rules in cases of hardship or other compelling reasons.
When Dolan first appealed the Board’s denial of his application to this court, we declined to serve as finders of fact, and remanded his application to the Board for a hearing and development of a complete factual record. We specifically retained jurisdiction to review the Board’s recommendations in Dolan’s case. In re Dolan, 445 N.W.2d at 555, 558.
The Board of Law Examiners held a formal hearing in December of 1988, at which the following issues were specifically addressed: (1) whether compelling circumstances existed which made a waiver of the educational requirements appropriate; (2) whether there were hardship grounds upon which to justify recommending waiver; and (3) whether the applicant had demonstrated competence. *fn2 On August 27, 1990, the Board issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law and determination that Dolan had failed to establish a basis upon which to grant a waiver of the educational requirements of Rule II A(3). The Board concluded:
1) Although Petitioner has been a licensed attorney since 1977, and spent five years as a public defender, his law practice from 1984 until 1989 was part-time and sporadic, consisting of occasional criminal court appointments in Hawaii and California, a few private cases, and a brief period of time in service as a traffic court referee.
2) Petitioner has failed to show that either hardship reasons or compelling circumstances exist upon which to base a waiver of the Board of Law Examiners Rule II (A)(3) requirement of graduation from an accredited law school as a prerequisite for admission to the Bar of Minnesota.
3) Petitioner has failed to prove any special competence or to show that there was anything extraordinary or unique about his practice.
State of Minnesota, Minnesota Board of Law Examiners, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Determination.
The conclusions of the Board of Law Examiners are given great deference.
In almost every case, [the recommendations of the Board of Law Examiners] stand. . . . We review the record and the Board’s findings independently, for the ultimate determination of admission to the Bar is reserved to this court alone, and we may not delegate that power. However, we give great weight to the Board’s findings in reaching our independent conclusion. We rely on the conscientious, informed and unstinting efforts of the members of the Board and on their opportunity to observe the witnesses. Only with greatest reluctance do we come to a conclusion other than that which the Board recommends.
In re Zbiegien, 433 N.W.2d 871, 874 (Minn. 1988) (citations omitted); see also In re Brown, 467 N.W.2d 622, 624 (Minn. 1991).
We almost never grant waiver of the educational requirements. See In re Busch, 313 N.W.2d 419 (Minn. 1981); In re Hansen, 275 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1978). Reliance upon the ABA accreditation standard is our only practical assurance that the legal education of a prospective attorney has sufficiently prepared the individual applicant for legal service. For reasons set forth in Hansen, we do not undertake substantive evaluation of law schools and we choose to rely instead upon the expertise of the ABA and its accreditation process. We have neither the resources nor the expertise. See id. at 797. Rule I B(6), however, does provide for a waiver of strict compliance with the rule in case of hardship or other compelling circumstances.
In this case, the Board conducted a careful and thorough investigation of Dolan’s petition for a Rule II A(3) waiver. Their investigation included a formal hearing at which Dolan was free to introduce evidence of hardship or other compelling reasons. The Board concluded that Dolan failed to show that there were either hardship reasons or other compelling circumstances upon which to base a Rule II A(3) waiver. Our review of the entire record provides us with no reason to reject the conclusions of the Board of Law Examiners. We deny the petition for waiver.
Dolan urges the Court to adopt a blanket rule that applicants who have been admitted to legal practice in another state for five out of the last six years should also be admitted to practice in Minnesota. While such a rule would cut down on the administrative burden of individualized review, we decline to adopt it. The rationale behind our stringent requirements for admission to practice law in the state is to ensure that “members of the bar are worthy of public trust with regard to their professional competence.” In re Busch, 313 N.W.2d at 421. We will not delegate this responsibility to another state.
Because we deny Dolan’s petition for failure to establish adequate grounds upon which to grant a waiver of the educational requirements of Rule II A(3), we do not reach the character and fitness issue raised on appeal.
Petition denied.
Does it matter how many jury trials the candidate has had? If this were a 5 attorney prosecutor’s office it would matter but this office has 30 attorneys. Managing that size of an office means getting the money and tools from the legislature and the county to get the job done.
What does matter is telling the truth during a campaign. Perhaps there is an excuse for Mr. Dolan: too much rubber chicken on the campaign trail. Either way, the public needs to hear the truth.
The last time I checked Mr. Dolan you have been suspended by the California Bar since 2009 for non-payment of dues.If that is incorrect, You need to contact California authorities.
Does that matter? No, people have financial difficulties but the truth matters.
Does it matter that your law school was not accredited?
Absolutely not. Some of the greatest lawyers in the history of this country, never spent a day in a formal law school. The truth does matter.
Personally, I am supporting Mitch Roth but it was a close decision between Mitch and Lincoln. I have known Lincoln since 1987 and Mitch since 1996. Lincoln has been away from prosecution for 12 years. I have watched Mitch night after night weekend after weekend giving his time to help this community for years. It left an indelible imprint on my mind. Both are gentlemen and would never call you on your misrepresentations. I am old school.Falsehoods not challenged become the truth to some. Your candidacy is viewed by some as a referendum on an ordinance that is already the law. Lincoln and Mitch will follow the law, even the ones they do not like unless and until a Court tells them it is unconstitutional.
Rick Damerville
] But you are in good company with Frankie and a (very) few others.